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A BREACH OF TRUST:
ROCK-KOSHKONONG LAKE DISTRICT
V. STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE
Wisconsin has a particularly notable tradition of using the public trust
doctrine aggressively to protect the state’s natural resources. The general
thrust of the doctrine’s evolution in Wisconsin has been expansion beyond
the doctrine’s traditional application to waters navigable for commercial
purposes. Emblematic of such expansion is the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s decision in Just v. Marinette County, which scholars have
characterized as a landmark extension of the public trust doctrine to nonnavigable wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. In light of this tradition,
it is unsurprising that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent
pronouncement that the Department of Natural Resources lacked public
trust jurisdiction to regulate privately-owned wetlands adjacent to a
navigable lake provoked strong reactions, not only by commentators but
also by certain members of the court. This Comment asserts that the
court’s opinion in Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State Department
of Natural Resources mischaracterized 150 years of precedent and, in
doing so, misconstrued Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine in a way that is
potentially devastating to future use of the doctrine for environmental
protection. By subtly re-casting the court’s precedents as delimiting rather
than expanding the state’s public trust jurisdiction, the Rock-Koshkonong
opinion undermines the particular adaptability of Wisconsin’s public trust
doctrine, which has allowed the doctrine to evolve along with societal
values and public needs, and which, for decades, has situated Wisconsin
as a leader in using the public trust doctrine for environmental protection.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly a decade, property owners along a 10,500-acre lake in
Rock County, Wisconsin, have been engaged in a dispute with the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) over what
amounts to seven inches of water.1 Individuals and businesses who own
property along Lake Koshkonong complain that low water levels on the
lake, which is just seven feet deep at its deepest, diminish the beauty of
their lakeside properties and limit their ability to recreate on the water.2
In response, the WDNR, which controls the dam that regulates water
levels on the lake, cites the adverse impact that higher water levels
would have on the more than twelve miles of wetlands that surround the
lake and sustain diverse wildlife and plant species.3 Against this
backdrop, a 2005 WDNR denial of the Rock-Koshkonong Lake
District’s request to raise water levels on Lake Koshkonong by 7.2
inches sparked a battle that eventually reached the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.4
1. Scott Bauer, Ruling Could Limit DNR Control Over Lake Levels, WIS. STATE J., July
17, 2013, at A4.
2. Stacy Vogel, Public, Private Interests Collide in Koshkonong Case, GAZETTEXTRA
(Feb. 20, 2008), http://gazettextra.com/news/2008/feb/20/public-private-interests-collide-koshk
onong-case/, archived at http://perma.cc/N4LW-AFZD.
3. Id.
4. Bauer, supra note 1.
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In Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State Department of Natural
Resources, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the WDNR properly
considered the environmental impact that higher lake levels would have
on surrounding, privately-owned wetlands, but failed to consider
adequately the economic impact of lower lake levels on riparian
property owners.5 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the state
circuit court for further proceedings.6 Despite the seeming triviality of
the controversy, not to mention the lack of any final resolution to the
dispute, the court’s decision in Rock-Koshkonong generated not only an
outcry from environmentalists in the state but also a vigorous dissent
from three members of the court.7 What provoked this response among
environmental advocates and certain members of the court were
statements in Justice Prosser’s majority opinion—arguably dicta—
regarding the scope of the WDNR’s authority under Wisconsin’s public
trust doctrine.8 Specifically, while the court held that the WDNR
possessed authority to consider the impact that higher lake levels would
have on surrounding, privately-owned wetlands, the court emphasized
that the WDNR exercised such authority pursuant to the state’s police
powers rather than its public trust jurisdiction.9
Courts and commentators have long acknowledged that Wisconsin
has a particularly rich tradition of using the public trust doctrine
aggressively to protect the state’s natural resources.10 In 1970, Professor

5. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dept. of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 11, 13,
350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.
6. Id. ¶ 14.
7. Patrick Marley, State Supreme Court Ruling in Lake-Level Case Stirs Concerns About
Water Protections, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 17, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/st
atepolitics/supreme-court-ruling-in-lake-level-case-impacts-public-trust-doctrine-b9955578z1215697151.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GL4D-3A4P.
8. Id.; see also Melissa K. Scanlan, It’s Not Open Season on Wetlands: A Lot of Verbiage
but Not Much Changes for Public Trust Doctrine, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 22, 2013),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/its-not-open-season-on-wetlands-b9959581z1-21652024
1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L2ER-BCJK (noting the media attention given to the
court’s discussion of the state’s public trust doctrine and identifying this discussion as dicta).
9. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 11.
10. See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 267, 145 N.W. 816, 818
(1914) (“It will thus be seen that ever since the organization of the Northwest territory in
1787 to the time of the adoption of our constitution the right to the free use of the navigable
waters of the state has been jealously reserved . . . .”); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Comment,
The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts,
Trustees and Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 138 (2000) (“Wisconsin, a
state containing over 1,200 lakes and bordered on the east and west by Lake Michigan and
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Joseph Sax published what has come to be regarded as the seminal work
on use of the public trust doctrine for environmental protection.11
Professor Sax highlighted the doctrine’s application to natural resource
protection in three states, including Wisconsin.12 Among the Wisconsin
cases most frequently cited in connection with the public trust doctrine
and its use for environmental protection is Just v. Marinette County, a
1972 decision in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a
shoreland zoning ordinance that restricted use of privately-owned
wetlands due to the impact that such use would have on adjacent
navigable waters.13
Scholars have consistently characterized this
decision as a landmark extension of the public trust doctrine beyond its
traditional application to navigable waters, subsequently enabling the
state to regulate adjacent non-navigable waters, such as wetlands,
pursuant to its public trust jurisdiction.14
Within this context, reactions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Rock-Koshkonong that the WDNR lacked authority
pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction to regulate privatelyowned wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are readily
understandable. The court’s pronouncement would seem, as Justice
Crooks asserted in his dissent, to “undermine . . . [the] court’s
precedent, recharacterize its holdings, and rewrite history.”15 Given this
the Mississippi River, respectively, has a rich 150-year history of using the public trust
doctrine to protect the natural heritage of the state.”).
11. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also Richard M. Frank, The Public
Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665,
667 (2012) (describing Professor Sax’s article as the first to “identif[y] and propose[] the
public trust doctrine as a key component of the then-new discipline of environmental law”).
12. Sax, supra note 11, at 509.
13. Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 26, 201 N.W.2d 761, 772 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 801 n.216 (2009); Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The
Interaction of the Public Trust and the “Takings” Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical
Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. REV. 81, 95 n.80 (1995); Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The
Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1450 & n.108; Frank, supra note 11, at 668;
Keith Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique in Environmental
Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 274 n.217 (2002); Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection PostLucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine on Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537,
569–70 (1994); Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA,
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 286–87 & n.14 (2014); Michael L. Wolz, Comment,
Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can
It Fill the Statutory Gaps?, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 494 (1992).
15. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 154, 350
Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800 (Crooks, J., dissenting).

2015]

A BREACH OF TRUST

1471

forceful statement by Justice Crooks, the question naturally arises:
whose characterization of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine—majority
or dissent—is more faithful to the state’s heritage of aggressively
executing its role as trustee of Wisconsin’s water resources?
This Comment asserts that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision
in Rock-Koshkonong re-characterized 150 years of precedent and, in
doing so, misconstrued Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine in a way that is
potentially devastating to future use of the doctrine for environmental
protection.16 Part II describes the dispute that gave rise to the RockKoshkonong decision, the reasoning underlying the court’s holding, and
the primary points of disagreement between the majority and the
dissent. This discussion highlights the divergent ways in which the
majority and dissent in Rock-Koshkonong interpreted Wisconsin’s
public trust doctrine. Part III then provides a brief overview of
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, including its historical origins, its
statutory codification, and, in particular, its development through
caselaw. This overview suggests that the general thrust of the doctrine’s
evolution in Wisconsin has been continuous expansion beyond the
doctrine’s traditional application to waters navigable for commercial
purposes. Emblematic of such expansion is the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s decision in Just v. Marinette County.
Against this backdrop, Part IV critically assesses the competing
conceptions of the doctrine that the majority and dissent advanced in
Rock-Koshkonong. In particular, Part IV demonstrates that the
majority subtly but substantially re-characterized the court’s precedents
as delimiting rather than expanding the scope of the public trust
doctrine. On the basis of this re-characterization, the majority
incorrectly concluded that Just stands for the proposition that the state
may regulate non-navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable waters only
pursuant to its police powers, not its public trust jurisdiction. While the
dissent correctly noted that this conclusion runs contrary to the plain
language of Just, both the majority and the dissent failed to recognize
that this distinction is logically untenable in light of the court’s holding
in Just.
16. Other early scholarly commentary on Rock-Koshkonong is similarly critical of the
decision’s characterization of precedent but more narrowly focused on the Rock-Koshkonong
majority’s treatment of Just in particular, as opposed to its interpretation of the state’s public
trust doctrine more broadly speaking. See generally Christian Eickelberg, Rock-Koshkonong
Lake District and the Surprising Narrowing of Wisconsin’s Public Trust Doctrine, 16 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 38 (2014).
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Part V then considers reactions to the Rock-Koshkonong decision,
both among members of the public and within the legal community.
This Part asserts that many commentators, including critics, do not fully
appreciate the decision’s implications for continued use of the public
trust doctrine as a tool for protecting Wisconsin’s natural resources.
Finally, Part VI concludes.
II. ROCK-KOSHKONONG LAKE DISTRICT V. STATE DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
In July 2013, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed an ongoing
dispute between the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District and the WDNR
regarding water levels on Lake Koshkonong.17 While the court’s
decision did little to resolve the actual dispute, it did generate a
significant amount of controversy due to the court’s treatment of the
state’s public trust doctrine.18 Specifically, Justice Prosser’s majority
opinion and Justice Crook’s dissent set forth characterizations of the
court’s public trust precedents that are diametrically opposed,19 leading
many to view the decision as a cross-roads for the doctrine’s future in
Wisconsin.20
A. Lake Koshkonong, the Rock River, and the Indianford Dam
Lake Koshkonong is a large but shallow inland lake located
primarily in Jefferson County.21 A “natural widening of the Rock
River,” the lake is situated approximately “four miles downstream from
the City of Fort Atkinson.”22 With a surface area of approximately
10,460 acres, it is the sixth largest inland lake in Wisconsin, but its
average depth is a mere five feet, with its deepest point being only about
seven feet.23 Due to the gradual descent of the lake’s shoreline into
deeper water, water depths of only one to two feet extend as far as
“hundreds of feet into the lake.”24
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See infra Part V.
21. Lake Koshkonong and the Indianford Dam, Case No. 3-SC-2003-28-3100LR, at 4–5
(Dep’t of Natural Res. Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Lake Koshkonong Review] (review of
decision).
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
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With approximately twenty-seven miles of shoreline, Lake
Koshkonong is currently surrounded by a combination of residential
and commercial properties, as well as undeveloped wetlands.25 The
coverage of the riparian wetlands is between 3,000 and 4,000 acres.26
Within this area are submerged aquatic beds, deep as well as shallow or
emergent marsh, wet meadows, and floodplain forests, among other
types of wetlands.27 One of the largest wetlands surrounding Lake
Koshkonong is the state-owned Koshkonong Wildlife Area, which is
comprised of approximately 715 acres of shallow marsh and wet
meadow.28 Other riparian wetlands are owned by private parties such as
the Carcajou Shooting Club and the Crescent Bay Hunt Club.29
In 1843, the Wisconsin Territorial Legislature authorized
construction of a dam across the Rock River approximately six miles
upstream of Lake Koshkonong.30 Since its construction, the dam’s
owners have included the Wisconsin Power & Light Co. and, from
December 1965 until December 2004, Rock County.31 In December
2004, the county conveyed ownership of the dam to the RockKoshkonong Lake District, “a public inland lake protection and
rehabilitation district,” which presently owns and operates the dam.32
The effect of the Indianford Dam is to alter upstream water levels on
the Rock River and Lake Koshkonong.33 While the initial authorization
for the dam’s construction included a provision prohibiting alterations in
flowage that resulted in flooding of privately owned land without the
owner’s consent,34 several modifications to the dam’s structure between
1900 and 1910 raised water levels on Lake Koshkonong, leading to
administrative appeals by property owners whose land flooded as a
result.35

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 10.
30. Lake Koshkonong and the Indianford Dam, Case No. 3-SC-2003-28-3100LR, ¶¶ 4–
5 (Dep’t of Natural Res. Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Lake Koshkonong Decision] (decision).
31. Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 6.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶¶ 6–7.
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As a consequence of these disputes, the Wisconsin Railroad
Commission36 “issued the first water level order for the Indianford Dam
in 1919.”37 In 1939, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, which
was the predecessor state agency to the WDNR, denied a request by
over one hundred area landowners to raise the mandated maximum
water level by six inches.38 The Commission cited the objections of
owners of low-lying properties and farms that would be subject to
flooding as a result of raising water levels.39
The 1919 water level order remained unchanged until 1982, when
the WDNR issued a new order pursuant to its statutory authority.40
While this order was contested, the compromise order issued in 1991 set
the water levels for Lake Koshkonong at their current range.41 The
WDNR’s primary concern in setting maximum water levels for Lake
Koshkonong in its 1991 order was the degradation of the wetlands
surrounding the lake due to increased water levels since construction of
the Indianford Dam.42 According to the WDNR, “The most important
ecological change for Lake Koshkonong has been the loss of wetlands
and submergent plants. . . .
[This loss] has resulted from the
maintenance of higher water levels, increased nutrient loads from the
watershed, and the introduction of common carp into the system.”43
Nonetheless, due to the Indianford Dam falling into general disrepair
between 1960 and 2001, lake levels consistently remained above the
maximum set by the 1991 WDNR order and furthermore increased
steadily over time.44

36. The Wisconsin legislature initially charged the Wisconsin Railroad Commission with
oversight of water levels at the Indianford Dam. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t
of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 24 n.8, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800. Subsequently, the
Public Service Commission and later the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
assumed responsibility for issuing water level orders under Wisconsin Statutes section
31.02(1). Id.
37. Id. ¶ 25; Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 7.
38. Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 6.
39. Id.
40. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 25.
41. Id. ¶ 28.
42. Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 10 (noting that, “[i]n 1982, the DNR
documented the loss of 52 acres of shoreline occurring between 1950 and 1963, and an
additional 270 acres between 1963 and 1975”).
43. Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 49.
44. Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 7.
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B. The Dispute
The dispute at the center of the Rock-Koshkonong decision arose as
a result of repairs made to the Indianford Dam in 2002, which restored
the dam to its full operating capacity and subsequently brought Lake
Koshkonong water levels down to their lowest point since the 1930s but
also more in line with the levels set by the WDNR’s 1991 order.45 On
April 21, 2003, the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District filed a petition
requesting that the WDNR raise water levels on Lake Koshkonong by
approximately eight inches during the winter months and by over one
foot during the summer months.46
In its petition, the District cited concerns about the impact of lower
lake levels on recreational activities on the lake.47 A District survey of
riparian property owners conducted in 2000 strongly suggested that a
majority of both residential and commercial property owners on or near
Lake Koshkonong believed that higher water levels would increase their
use and enjoyment of their properties, allowing, among other things, for
riparian property owners to maintain shorter piers to reach water depths
capable of supporting boats.48
After conducting an Environmental Assessment, as required by the
Wisconsin Administrative Code, the WDNR issued a decision on April
15, 2005, granting certain requested changes in water levels during the
winter months but denying the District’s petition to raise water levels
during the summer months.49 In its decision, the WDNR acknowledged
the benefits that higher summer water levels would have for riparian
property owners with regard to the use of boats and shorter pier
lengths.50 The WDNR found, however, that raising summer water levels
on Lake Koshkonong would have substantial negative effects on
surrounding wetlands.51 Citing its statutory authority to regulate and
control water levels, the WDNR concluded that granting the District’s
petition to raise summer water levels on Lake Koshkonong would be
“inconsistent with the interest of public rights in Lake Koshkonong and

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 27.
Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 4.
Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 27.
Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 22.
Id. at 4.
Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 16.
Id. ¶¶ 17–24.

1476

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1467

the Rock River and would not promote safety or protect life, health or
property.”52
In response to the WDNR’s decision, the District, together with the
Rock River–Koshkonong Association, Inc., and the Lake Koshkonong
Recreation Association, Inc., petitioned the WDNR for a contested
hearing.53 The WDNR granted this request, and on December 1, 2006,
an administrative law judge sustained the WDNR’s decision.54 In
particular, the agency decision concluded that “[t]he great weight of the
evidence support[ed] the DNR’s 2005 order and decision to maintain
‘summer’ water levels at the levels set in 1991 . . . as being ‘in the
interest of public rights in navigable waters’ and ‘to promote safety and
protect, life, health and property.’”55
Following unsuccessful appeal of the agency decision to the Rock
County Circuit Court and Wisconsin Court of Appeals,56 the District
petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review, which the court
granted.57
C. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision
On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered four issues: (1)
“what level of deference . . . should be accorded to the . . . [WDNR’s]
conclusions of law”; (2) whether the WDNR had “exceed[ed] its
authority in making a water level determination” on the basis of the
assessed impact that water levels would have on adjacent, privatelyowned wetlands; (3) whether the WDNR had exceeded its authority by
considering the Wisconsin Administrative Code’s wetland water quality
standards when making its water level determination; and (4) whether
the WDNR had erred in “refusing to consider the impact[] of water
levels on residential property values, business income, and public
revenue.”58

52. Id. ¶ 51.
53. Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 1.
54. Id. at 1, 31.
55. Id. at 29 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 31.02(1) (2003–2004)).
56. See generally Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2011 WI
App 115, 336 Wis. 2d 677, 803 N.W.2d 853.
57. Order Granting Petition for Review of Rosh-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 339
Wis. 2d 734, 810 N.W.2d 221 (unpublished table order).
58. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 4–8,
350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.
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Of these four issues, only the second is germane to the present
discussion. Although the court held that the WDNR possessed
statutory authority to consider the impact that raising lake levels would
have on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands, Justice Prosser, writing for
the court, discussed at length the conclusion that the WDNR lacked
such authority under Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine as enshrined in
the state’s constitution, implemented in the state’s statutory scheme, and
interpreted by the court’s earlier decisions.59 It was, in large part, this
discussion that provoked Justice Crooks’s highly critical dissent, which
two other members of the court joined.60
1. Majority
The majority began its discussion of the WDNR’s authority to
consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands
by noting that the agency decision confirming the WDNR order
explicitly identified Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine as the source of the
WDNR’s authority.61 The majority further noted that, in its brief to the
court, the District specifically argued that the WDNR had exceeded its
authority under the public trust doctrine when it considered the impact
of lake levels on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands.62 On these
grounds, the majority launched into a lengthy discussion of Wisconsin’s
public trust doctrine, including its constitutional and statutory bases,
and, in particular, the evolution of the doctrine through the court’s
precedents.63
The majority cited Article IX, Section 1 of the Wisconsin
Constitution as the basis for the state’s regulatory authority, noting that
the constitution “commands that the state hold navigable waters in trust

59. Id. ¶ 11.
60. Id. ¶¶ 153, 189 (Crooks, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices also disagreed with
the majority on the issue of whether the WDNR erred in excluding evidence of the secondary
economic impact of water levels from its consideration, which formed the basis for the court’s
decision to remand the case to the state circuit court for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 152
(majority opinion); id. ¶ 155 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
61. Id. ¶ 67 (majority opinion) (citing to the paragraph in the agency decision that
identifies “the public trust doctrine as authority for the DNR to regulate wetlands and near
shorelands, wildlife habitat, and scenic beauty”).
62. Id. ¶ 65 (“The District is also concerned about the application of the public trust
doctrine to any wetlands that are not navigable in fact unless those wetlands are below the
[ordinary high-water marks]. The District asserts that the DNR’s position significantly
expands the scope of the DNR’s public trust jurisdiction.”).
63. Id. ¶ 69.
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for the public.”64 The majority went on to acknowledge that the court’s
prior decisions had interpreted this directive broadly to recognize “more
than just commercial navigability rights.”65 Rather, the state’s public
trust doctrine affords protection even for “purely recreational purposes
such as boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, . . . and . . . preserv[ing]
scenic beauty.”66
Despite this expansive interpretation of the rights secured to the
public under Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, the majority explained,
the state’s regulatory jurisdiction under the doctrine has always been
strictly confined to a limited geographic area—to navigable waters
between the boundaries of the ordinary high-water marks.67 On this
basis, the majority concluded that the WDNR lacked authority to
consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands
pursuant to its public trust jurisdiction because the wetlands surrounding
Lake Koshkonong are neither navigable nor below the original highwater marks of the lake.68
The primary concern that more expansive exercise of the state’s
public trust authority would raise, according to the majority, involves
questions of ownership.69 As the majority explained,
Contemplating the question of ownership is important because
the public trust doctrine implicates state ownership or virtual
state ownership—by virtue of its trust responsibility—of land
under navigable waters. If the public trust were extended to
cover wetlands that are not navigable, it would create significant
questions about ownership of and trespass on private land, and it
would be difficult to cabin expansion of the state’s new
constitutionally based jurisdiction over private land.70

64. Id. ¶ 71.
65. Id. ¶ 72.
66. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶ 19,
244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. ¶¶ 76, 91 (citing Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W.2d
514, 519 (1952); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 272, 145 N.W. 816, 820
(1914)). The test for whether a body of water is “navigable” is whether it is “navigable in fact
for any purpose.” Muench, 261 Wis. at 505–06 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WIS. STAT.
§ 30.01(1) (1951)). “Ordinary high-water marks” refer to the distinct marks that the
continuous presence of water leaves on the shoreline or bank. Diana Shooting Club, 156 Wis.
at 272.
68. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 77, 93.
69. Id. ¶¶ 77–78.
70. Id. ¶ 84 (emphasis omitted).
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Because the public trust doctrine vests ownership of land beneath
navigable bodies of water in the state, allowing the WDNR to consider
the impact of lake levels on surrounding wetlands pursuant to its public
trust jurisdiction would, in the majority’s view, call into question the
ownership of such wetlands.71
Critical to the majority’s conclusion that the WDNR lacked
authority to consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent, privatelyowned wetlands pursuant to its public trust jurisdiction was its treatment
of Just v. Marinette County, in which the court dealt explicitly with the
state’s authority to regulate privately-owned wetlands adjacent to a
navigable lake.72 As the majority explained, Just upheld a shoreland
zoning ordinance that required a permit for the filling of wetlands on
privately-owned property adjacent to a navigable lake as an exercise of
the state’s police powers, not its public trust authority.73 The majority
based this interpretation primarily on the fact that, in Just, the property
to which the zoning ordinance applied extended 1,000 feet beyond the
ordinary high-water marks of any navigable body of water.74
Accordingly, the majority stated, “It should be obvious that the state
does not have constitutional public trust jurisdiction to regulate land a
distance of more than three football fields away from a navigable lake or
pond.”75
On the basis of this analysis, the majority held that the WDNR
possessed statutory authority to consider the impact of lake levels on
adjacent, privately-owned wetlands under Wisconsin Statutes section
31.02(1), but that such authority existed pursuant only to the state’s
police powers.76
Essential to this holding was the majority’s
construction of Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1) as codifying only in
71. Id.
72. Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 12–13, 201 N.W.2d 761, 766 (1972). As the
dissenting justices in Rock-Koshkonong noted, scholars have frequently cited Just as
extending the state’s public trust jurisdiction to non-navigable waters above the ordinary
high-water marks. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 170 n.4 (Crooks, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 14 and accompanying text. As such, it was essential to the majority’s reasoning
that it redefined Just as an exercise of the state’s police power as opposed to its public trust
jurisdiction, an interpretation of Just that is ultimately unconvincing. See infra Part IV.B.
73. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 96.
74. Id. ¶ 100.
75. Id.
76. Id. ¶¶ 109–10 (“The DNR may emphasize some rights over others in its water level
determinations, and its exercise of discretion will normally be upheld so long as it considers
all property rights and so long as it does not accord some non-navigable land or water above
the [ordinary high-water marks] a constitutional preference as trust land . . . .”).
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part the state’s public trust doctrine.77 Specifically, the majority focused
on the disjunctive “or” in section 31.02(1) as authorizing regulation in
part pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction (regulation “in the
interest of public rights in navigable waters”) and in part pursuant to the
state’s police powers (regulation “to promote safety and protect life,
health and property”).78 The implications of this distinction in the
context of the Lake Koshkonong dispute are, from the majority’s
perspective, clear:
[T]he distinction between the DNR’s constitutionally based
public trust authority and the DNR’s police power-based
statutory authority is that the latter is subject to constitutional
and statutory protections afforded to property, may be modified
from time to time by the legislature, and requires some balancing
of competing interests in enforcement.79
2. Dissent
Three justices dissented from the judgment remanding the case to
the state circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the holding
that the WDNR may not exclude evidence of the secondary economic
impact of lake levels on adjacent property owners.80 While the
dissenting justices agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the WDNR
possessed authority to consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent,
privately-owned wetlands under Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1),
they strongly disagreed with the majority’s discussion of the limitations
of the state’s public trust jurisdiction.81 In this regard, the dissent’s
criticisms of the majority opinion were twofold: (1) that the present
controversy could be (and was) resolved through statutory construction
alone, without the need to reach the constitutional issue of the scope of
the state’s public trust doctrine; and (2) that the majority needlessly
raised the public trust doctrine in a way that mischaracterized the
court’s precedent and significantly weakened the doctrine as enshrined

77. Id. ¶ 102.
78. Id. ¶ 103 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 31.02(1) (2009–2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
79. Id. ¶ 101.
80. Id. ¶¶ 153, 155, 189 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
81. Id. ¶¶ 153–54.
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in the Wisconsin Constitution.82 The consequence, according to the
dissent, is “a significant and disturbing shift in Wisconsin law.”83
The dissent’s statutory argument is simple: based on the plain
language of Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1), the WDNR has clear
authority to consider the impact that water levels on Lake Koshkonong
will have on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands.84 As the dissent
acknowledged, the majority did not dispute this assertion85; what the
majority did dispute was the source of authority that this statutory
provision embodies.86 The dissent thus went on to argue that the
majority’s interpretation of Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1) as
codifying only in part the state’s public trust doctrine was a novel
interpretation without support in the court’s precedents.87
The dissent took issue with the majority’s characterization of the
court’s public trust precedents in general and with its treatment of Just
in particular. Specifically, the dissent argued that the overall thrust of
the court’s precedents had been expansion of the state’s public trust
jurisdiction, with Just standing for the proposition that the state may
regulate non-navigable waters to the extent that such waters affect
adjacent navigable waters.88 By re-characterizing Just as an exercise of
the state’s police powers rather than its public trust jurisdiction, the
majority, in the words of the dissent, “untethers our constitutional
jurisprudence from its foundation and attempts to transform 165 years

82. Id. ¶¶ 154, 168 (“Instead of limiting itself to addressing only what must be
addressed, the majority seizes this opportunity to limit the public trust doctrine in an
unforeseen way, transforming the state’s affirmative duty to protect the public trust into a
legislative choice.”).
83. Id. ¶ 154.
84. Id. ¶ 167 (“Both the majority and the petitioner agree that a simple reading of
§ 31.02(1) demonstrates that the statute allows for consideration of private wetlands.”).
Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1) provides, in relevant part, that the DNR, “in the interest
of public rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect life, health and property
may regulate and control the level and flow of water in all navigable waters . . . .” WIS. STAT.
§ 31.02(1) (2013–2014). As the majority in Rock-Koshkonong notes, the District did not
contest that privately owned wetlands adjacent to Lake Koshkonong constitute “property”
subject to regulation within the meaning of the statute. Rock Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74,
¶ 109. The majority thus concludes, “There can be no dispute that the DNR can consider
water level impact on all adjacent property under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).” Id. (emphasis
added).
85. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 167 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
86. See supra Part II.C.1.
87. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 168 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
88. Id. ¶¶ 164–65.

1482

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1467

of constitutional precedent into a mere legislative exercise of the state’s
police power.”89
3. Divergent Interpretations of Wisconsin’s Public Trust Doctrine
The fundamental disagreement between the majority and the dissent
in Rock-Koshkonong thus concerned how the court’s public trust
precedents should be characterized. The majority relied on Diana
Shooting Club v. Husting90 and Muench v. Public Service Commission91
to define the public trust doctrine as applying only to navigable bodies
of water up to the ordinary high-water mark.92 In this context, the
majority concluded that Just could not have upheld the shoreland zoning
ordinances at issue in that case pursuant to the state’s public trust
jurisdiction because the shoreland in question did not fall within the
ordinary high-water marks of a navigable body of water.93 By contrast,
the dissent viewed Just as the culmination of a series of earlier decisions
expanding the public trust doctrine beyond its initial application to
waters navigable for commercial purposes only.94 In assessing the RockKoshkonong decision, then, the fundamental question that arises is
which side—majority or dissent—set forth a more plausible
interpretation of the state’s public trust doctrine?
III. WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
At its most basic level, the public trust doctrine “provides that
certain natural resources are held by the government in a special
status—in ‘trust’—for current and future generations.”95 The origins of
the public trust doctrine are ancient, traceable to Roman law that
defined certain types of property, including the sea, seashore, and rivers,
as permanently preserved for public use due to the particularly public
benefits like navigation and fishing that are derived from such

89. Id. ¶ 166.
90. 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
91. 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
92. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 86.
93. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
94. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 160–61 (Crooks, J., dissenting) (noting the
“growth of the public trust doctrine over time” with reference to Diana Shooting Club,
Muench, and Just).
95. Frank, supra note 11, at 667.
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property.96 Under English common law, the monarch held title to the
land beneath any waters influenced by the tide to preserve for the public
a right to navigation and fishing on such waters.97 The so-called
“lodestar” in American public trust law is Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. Illinois,98 in which the United States Supreme Court provided the
foundational articulation of the public trust doctrine in the United
States.99 Specifically, the Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. affirmed
the American common law principle that the state holds title to the land
beneath navigable bodies of water, including inland bodies of water not
affected by the tide, to preserve the public rights to navigation,
commerce, and fishing on such waters.100
Notwithstanding this “lodestar,” the public trust doctrine has
evolved along lines distinct to each state.101 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that states possess
authority to define the limits of their respective public trust doctrines.102
In exercising this latitude, states have largely tended to expand on the
doctrine as defined in Illinois Central Railroad Co., often by extending
the geographic scope of the doctrine’s applicability and by recognizing
public uses protected under the doctrine beyond the rights to
navigation, commerce, and fishing.103 Wisconsin has consistently been at
96. Sax, supra note 11, at 475. For further discussion of the origins of the public trust
doctrine in Roman and English law, see id. at 475–78; Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson,
The Public Trust Doctrine and Sustainable Ecosystems: A Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 322, 324–26 (2006).
97. See Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, 325–29.
98. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
99. Id. at 452; Sax, supra note 11, at 489. For an in-depth examination of Illinois Central
Railroad Co. and its role in defining the public trust doctrine in the United States, see
generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).
100. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452; see also Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96,
328–29; Sax, supra note 11, at 489–90.
101. Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, at 323 (noting that “fairly substantial
differences exist in the interpretation of the doctrine between jurisdictions even given guiding
light cases like Illinois Central”); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western
States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 55–56 (2010) (emphasizing that “the states
have progressed and diverged in interesting ways beyond the precepts of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s seminal discussion of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois”).
102. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
103. See David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in
Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)use
of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 357 (2002) (“In the last thirty

1484

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1467

the forefront of this expansion, particularly with respect to defining
navigability in more expansive terms and recognizing additional rights
preserved to the public under the doctrine.104 The state’s public trust
doctrine is thus best characterized as not only expansive but also elastic,
capable of being stretched to address changing social norms and
emergent public concerns.105
A. Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine originated in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, whereby the Virginia legislature ceded control of the
years, many state courts have expanded the geographical reach and substantive scope of the
public trust doctrine. In particular, a spate of recent decisions have extended it to cover
resources beyond navigable waterways, while also finding that the trust protects public uses in
such resources other than the traditional triad of commerce, navigation, and fishing.”); Robin
Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of
States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (noting
the ability of states to “expand upon the federal public trust doctrine” and the ways in which
they have done so); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights
and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 705 (2006) (citing Phillips Petroleum
Co. as “allowing states a wide berth to expand the [public trust] doctrine’s protection beyond
a federal minimum”).
104. Craig, supra note 103, at 18–19 (“Wisconsin’s already broad public trust doctrine is
potentially even broader, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in 1952 that the public
can use the public trust waters for navigation, hunting, fishing, recreation ‘or any other lawful
purpose.’” (quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519
(1952))); Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and
Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 942–43 (2007)
(“Of all the Great Lakes states, Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine is the most expansive in
scope.”); id. at 914–15 (“Wisconsin courts have been leaders in applying a very broad
definition of navigability, which includes streams capable of floating a recreational boat of the
shallowest draft, certain artificial waters connected to navigable waters, and, in some
instances, non-navigable streams that impact navigable waters.”); Henquinet & Dobson,
supra note 96, at 352 (“Wisconsin probably has the strongest public trust doctrine in the
[Great Lakes] basin . . . .”).
105. Because the focus of the present discussion is on the Rock-Koshkonong decision
and its interpretation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, this Comment takes no position on
whether an expansive public trust doctrine is normatively desirable. It is worth noting,
however, that the topic has received considerable scholarly attention, particularly in the wake
of Professor Sax’s call for liberal application of the doctrine for environmental protection.
See Sax, supra note 11, at 556–57 (calling for application of the public trust doctrine beyond
its “quite narrow” traditional scope). For a critical discussion of expansion of the public trust
doctrine, see generally James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2007). For a response to Professor
Huffman’s criticisms that acknowledges the doctrine’s expansion beyond its traditional scope
but defends such expansion as a useful means of filling regulatory gaps, see generally Hope
M. Babcock, Essay, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV.
393 (2009).
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Northwest Territory on two conditions: (1) that the states newly
admitted to the Union would be sovereign entities to the same extent as
the original members of the Union; and (2) that the navigable waters
connected with the Mississippi and St. Lawrence rivers would be
permanently and freely accessible to the public.106 Wisconsin, which was
located within the Northwest Territory, was admitted to the Union as a
state in 1848 and, upon admission, directly adopted the language of the
Northwest Ordinance as Article IX of the Wisconsin Constitution.107
Specifically, Section 1 of Article IX provides:
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all rivers and
lakes bordering on this state so far as such rivers or lakes shall
form a common boundary to the state and any other state or
territory now or hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the
same; and the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places
between the same, shall be common highways and forever free,
as well to the inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the
United States, without any tax, impost or duty therefor.108
On this constitutional basis, the Wisconsin legislature, the WDNR, and
the Wisconsin Supreme Court have, over the past 150 years, defined the
contours of the state’s public trust doctrine.109

106. Muench, 261 Wis. at 499. The Northwest Ordinance provided, in relevant part:
The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying
places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States, and those of
any other states that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost
or duty therefor.
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 266–67, 145 N.W. 816, 818 (1914) (quoting An
Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River
Ohio, art. 4 (1787), as adopted by An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory
North-West of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.a (1789)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Muench, 261 Wis. at 499–500.
108. WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
109. See Scanlan, supra note 10, at 138 (describing the “three state institutions [that]
have been instrumental in defining the scope of public rights and the responsibility of the
state trustee” in Wisconsin).
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B. Codification of the Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin Statutes
Under the state’s public trust doctrine, the Wisconsin legislature is
the primary trustee of the state’s water resources.110 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has defined the legislature’s obligations under the public
trust doctrine as an affirmative duty to not only safeguard but also
enhance the public’s rights in the state’s navigable waters: “[T]he trust,
being both active and administrative, requires the law-making body to
act in all cases where action is necessary, not only to preserve the trust
but to promote it.”111 Accordingly, the legislature has passed a series of
statutes that regulate use of the state’s navigable waters and delegate
enforcement to the WDNR.112 Chapter 30 of the Wisconsin Statutes,
which governs “navigable waters, harbors and navigation,”113 “embodies
a system of regulation of Wisconsin’s navigable waters pursuant to the
public trust doctrine” and “delegate[s] to the DNR broad authority to
regulate under the public trust doctrine.”114 Similarly, Chapter 31 of the
Wisconsin Statutes regulates dams and bridges affecting navigable
waters and likewise delegates administration of these regulations to the
WDNR.115
C. Development of the Public Trust Doctrine Through Caselaw
Scholars have long acknowledged Wisconsin to have a particularly
well-developed body of caselaw interpreting the state’s public trust
doctrine.116 Early in the state’s history, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
110. City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 449, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (1927) (“The trust
reposed in the State is not a passive trust; it is governmental, active, and administrative.
Representing the State in its legislative capacity, the legislature is fully vested with the power
of control and regulation.”).
111. Id. at 449.
112. Bridget Donegan, Comment, The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Beyond Michigan and Wisconsin Common Law, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 455, 479
(2009).
113. WIS. STAT. §§ 30.01–30.99 (2013–2014) (capitalization omitted).
114. ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 2002 WI 106, ¶¶ 11–12, 255 Wis.
2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854.
115. WIS. STAT. §§ 31.01–31.99. Of particular importance to the present discussion,
Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02 delegates authority to the WDNR to regulate water levels in
all navigable bodies of water. The statute provides in relevant part that “[t]he department, in
the interest of public rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect life, health
and property may regulate and control the level and flow of water in all navigable waters.”
Id. § 31.02(1).
116. Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, at 350 (indicating that “Wisconsin has not
surprisingly entertained a substantial amount of public trust litigation” due to the prevalence
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declared that “the state is the owner of the fee of all lands under
navigable waters in the Great Lakes, but in trust only, for the public
uses and purposes of navigation and fishing.”117
Of particular
importance to the present discussion are a series of cases decided in the
wake of this early pronouncement that clarified the scope of the state’s
powers and duties under the public trust doctrine.118
In Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
addressed both the scope of the waters that the state holds in trust and
the rights secured to the public in those waters.119 Diana Shooting Club
involved an action for trespass against a hunter who had pushed his boat
into vegetation growing on the plaintiff’s property while duck hunting
on the Rock River.120 The defendant hunter maintained that he had
remained on waters held in trust for the public and that such waters
were held in trust not only for purposes of navigation, but also for
hunting, fishing, and other recreational purposes.121 In holding that the
defendant had not trespassed on the plaintiff’s property, the court
declared that the waters held in trust by the state extend to the ordinary
high-water marks on the shores or banks of any navigable body of
water.122 The court defined “ordinary high-water mark” as “the point on
the bank or shore up to which the presence and action of the water is so
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of
terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic.”123

of Great Lakes shoreline, inland lakes, and navigable rivers within the state); Sax, supra note
11, at 509 (citing Wisconsin as among those states that have “the most amply developed case
law in the public trust area”); Donegan, supra note 112, at 460 (stating that Wisconsin has
“some of the richest law in the region concerning the public trust doctrine”).
117. McLennan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427, 443, 55 N.W. 764, 770 (1893).
118. Because the focus of this Comment is the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in
Rock-Koshkonong, a comprehensive overview of Wisconsin’s public trust caselaw is beyond
the scope of the present discussion. For a more complete treatment of Wisconsin cases
addressing the public trust doctrine, see Craig, supra note 103, at 11–13 (outlining key cases
addressing the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin); Donegan, supra note 112, at 478–84
(discussing in detail the scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine as defined through caselaw,
including the state’s obligations as trustee, as well as citizen standing to enforce Wisconsin’s
public trust doctrine). For a thorough historical examination of earlier cases addressing the
public trust doctrine in Wisconsin, see Sax, supra note 11, at 509–23.
119. 156 Wis. 261, 272, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).
120. Id. at 265.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 272.
123. Id.
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The court in Diana Shooting Club further held that members of the
public retain the right to hunt so long as they remain between the
boundaries of the ordinary high-water marks.124 In reaching this
conclusion, the court defined the rights preserved to the public under
the public trust doctrine more broadly than navigation, commerce, and
fishing: “[Navigable waters] should be free to all for commerce, for
travel, for recreation, and also for hunting and fishing, which are now
mainly certain forms of recreation.”125 The court reasoned that this
broad interpretation was necessary to give effect to the purpose
underlying the state’s public trust doctrine—to preserve to the public
the “full and free use of public waters.”126
While Diana Shooting Club thus expanded the rights preserved to
the public under the public trust doctrine to include all recreational uses,
Muench v. Public Service Commission similarly expanded the definition
of “navigable waters” that fall within the scope of the state’s trust.127
Muench addressed a challenge by a conservation group and private
citizens to the Public Service Commission’s grant of approval for
construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Namekagon River in
Washburn County.128 In the context of this challenge, the Muench court
defined “navigable waters” as any body of water “which is capable of
floating any boat, skiff, or canoe, of the shallowest draft used for
recreational purposes.”129 The court situated this definition in an
extended discussion of the historical test for navigability, which turned
on whether or not the body of water in question was usable for
commercial purposes.130 In departing from this historical test, the court
cited Diana Shooting Club and its expansion of the rights secured to the
public under the public trust doctrine.131 Because Diana Shooting Club
had interpreted the rights secured to the public in broad terms that
124. Id. (“Hunting on navigable waters is lawful when it is confined strictly to such
waters while they are in a navigable stage, and between the boundaries of the ordinary highwater marks.”).
125. Id. at 271.
126. Id.
127. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (1952).
128. Id. at 497–98.
129. Id. at 506.
130. Id. at 500–01 (discussing Wisconsin’s early use of the “saw-log” test for navigability
and indicating that this test was based on “commercial considerations”).
131. Id. at 504–05 (“[Diana Shooting Club] is significant in that the navigability was
established not through any commercial use, such as floating of logs, but through the use of
shallow draft boats for purposes of recreation.”).
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extended beyond mere navigation or fishing for commercial purposes,
the test for navigability, the court reasoned, should likewise extend
beyond navigability for commercial purposes.132 The court thus
characterized its definition of “navigable waters” as “keeping with the
trend manifested in the development of the law of navigable waters in
this state to extend the rights of the general public to the recreational
use of the waters of this state, and to protect the public in the enjoyment
of such rights.”133
Together, Diana Shooting Club and Muench clarify the scope of the
state’s powers and duties under the public trust doctrine by defining two
key elements of the doctrine: navigability and the rights preserved to the
public in the state’s navigable waters. After Diana Shooting Club and
Muench, it is clear that, at a minimum, the state holds in trust for the
public any body of water that is capable of floating any vessel used for
recreational purposes, and that the state’s trust extends to the ordinary
high-water marks of such bodies of water.134 Beyond merely clarifying
these particular aspects of the public trust doctrine, however, both
Diana Shooting Club and Muench set a course for expansive application
of the doctrine. Indicative of this course are several key cases decided in
the decades following Diana Shooting Club and Muench, which rely on
these earlier decisions to suggest that the public trust doctrine may
apply to certain non-navigable bodies of water to protect public interests
as varied as preventing pollution and preserving the state’s scenic
beauty.
More than two decades after Muench, in De Gayner & Co. v.
Department of Natural Resources, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
revisited the test for navigability.135 The court in De Gayner addressed
the issue of whether a creek on which a developer sought to build a dam
was navigable, which would in turn require the developer to obtain a
permit prior to constructing the dam.136 The developer in this case was
the sole riparian owner of the creek.137 Testimony by various individuals
indicated that it was possible to traverse the creek by canoe due
primarily to the presence of a number of beaver dams, which had the
132. Id. at 512.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 506.
135. De Gayner & Co. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 70 Wis. 2d 936, 938, 236 N.W.2d 217,
218 (1975).
136. Id. at 938–39.
137. Id. at 938.
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effect of raising water levels on the creek.138 Accordingly, the developer
argued that the creek was not navigable in its natural condition but only
as a result of being altered by the beaver dams.139 In holding that the
creek was in fact navigable, the court applied the test for navigability as
outlined in Muench.140 The court further noted, “[T]here are no
requirements in the Wisconsin law that only ‘normal or natural
conditions’ are to be considered in determining navigability.”141 Rather,
the court explained, artificial conditions may render a body of water
navigable so long as those conditions have “existed for a period of
time.”142
While the court thus further clarified the test for navigability as
established in Muench, the court also suggested that the “modern test”
for navigability that Muench set forth may in fact be even broader than
navigability per se.143 Specifically, the court noted that Muench had
ultimately been remanded to the Public Service Commission for a
determination of “whether public rights for the recreational enjoyment
of the stream in its present natural condition outweigh the benefits to
the public which would result in the construction of the dam.”144 On this
basis, the court proposed that the test for applicability of the public trust
doctrine under Muench might extend beyond navigability altogether:
“Under that broader test foreshadowed by Muench, the question would
appear to be whether any beneficial interest whatsoever of the public
will be served by the continued existence of the original stream.”145
In the same way that De Gayner revisited the question of
navigability, Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Department of
Natural Resources dealt once again with the question of what rights are
preserved to the public under the public trust doctrine.146 Wisconsin’s
Environmental Decade involved a city resolution that prohibited the use
138. Id. at 940–43.
139. Id. at 940–42.
140. Id. at 945 (noting that Muench “established the modern test of navigability” and
applying that test to the facts of the present case).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 946.
143. Id. at 948–49 (“We are not, however, unmindful of the broad sweep of the modern
test hinted at in Muench v. Public Service Comm.”).
144. Id. at 949 (quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 515b, 53 N.W.2d
514, 525 (1952)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
145. De Gayner, 70 Wis. 2d at 949.
146. See Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 85 Wis. 2d 518, 526,
271 N.W.2d 69, 72–73 (1978).
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of chemical treatments on lakes in Madison despite the WDNR’s
issuance of a blanket permit allowing such treatments.147 The chemical
treatments were intended to eliminate weeds in Lakes Mendota and
Monona that made various recreational activities difficult and
dangerous.148 The Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the
city resolution.149 The court reasoned that, although the state legislature
had delegated to the city the power to prohibit chemical treatments, that
power was subject to any other statutory provisions limiting or
withdrawing such power.150
Because Wisconsin Statutes section
144.025(2) expressly authorized the WDNR to supervise chemical
treatment of waters in the state, and because the city’s resolution was
inconsistent with the WDNR’s order granting a permit in this case, the
court held that the city’s power to issue such a resolution was effectively
revoked.151
Although Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade thus struck down a city
resolution that provided more aggressive environmental protection
because it conflicted with the legislative grant of authority to the
WDNR, the decision is significant precisely because the court identified
protection of natural resources as a public interest that the state is
required to preserve under the public trust doctrine.152 The court noted
that its earlier decisions had recognized recreational interests beyond
commercial navigation and fishing.153 The court then went on to
indicate that societal changes had created new interests over time:
[I]ncreased leisure time, improved transportation facilities, the
consequent growth of Wisconsin’s water-centered recreation
industry, and the continued deterioration of the quality of the

147. Id. at 523.
148. Id. at 523–24.
149. Id. at 539.
150. Id. at 534.
151. Id. at 535.
152. See Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, at 351 (“Ironically, or perhaps wrongly,
the court struck down a more protective environmental regulation by the City of Madison,
because it conflicted with the authority delegated to the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources as part of the affirmative duty of the State to protect the environment under the
public trust doctrine. Regardless, this is probably the most pro-environmental protection
statement that one will find in the public trust doctrine decisions that apply to the Great
Lakes.” (footnote omitted)).
153. Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, 85 Wis. 2d at 526 (acknowledging that the state’s public
trust obligations “require[] the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and
preserve its waters for fishing, hunting, recreation, and scenic beauty”).
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waters of the state have awakened widespread interest in all
Wisconsin’s waters and have served to underscore the fact that
maintaining pure and attractive rivers, lakes and streams is a
matter of statewide concern.154
On the basis of this analysis, the court concluded that “[p]reventing
pollution and protecting the quality of the waters of the state are valid
police-power concerns, as well as being part of the state’s affirmative
duty under the ‘public trust’ doctrine.”155
Thus, in the wake of Diana Shooting Club and Muench, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court not only continued to clarify its definition of
the public trust doctrine but furthermore suggested a much broader
scope for the doctrine than its historical application to waters navigable
for commercial purposes. The public trust doctrine as articulated by the
court in De Gayner and Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade would
seemingly enable the state to regulate non-navigable waters to the
extent necessary to protect public interests in the environmental wellbeing and scenic beauty of the state’s natural resources.156 Nowhere is
this potentially expansive scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine
more apparent than in the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1972 decision
upholding a shoreland zoning ordinance in Just v. Marinette County.
D. Just v. Marinette County
In Just v. Marinette County, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a shoreland zoning ordinance constituted a
regulatory taking of private property requiring compensation.157 The
county ordinance in question required property owners to obtain a
permit prior to filling, draining, or dredging any wetlands within 1,000
feet of a navigable lake or 300 feet of a navigable river.158 The Justs,
who owned a parcel of designated wetlands adjacent to a navigable lake
in Marinette County, challenged the ordinance after attempting to fill a
portion of their property without the required permit.159 The Justs
alleged that the ordinance amounted to a constructive taking of their

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 533.
See supra Part III.C.
Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 9, 14, 201 N.W.2d 761, 764, 767 (1972).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
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private property by denying them all beneficial use of the wetland.160
Marinette County and the State of Wisconsin argued, in turn, that the
shoreland zoning ordinance constituted a reasonable exercise of the
state’s police powers to protect navigable waters from the harmful
effects of uncontrolled use and development of the shoreland.161
The court in Just held that the Marinette County ordinance did not
rise to the level of a taking requiring compensation.162 In reaching this
conclusion, the court undertook a lengthy discussion of not only
regulatory takings jurisprudence but also Wisconsin’s public trust
doctrine.163 The court first highlighted the distinction between an
exercise of the state’s police power (not requiring compensation) and an
exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain (requiring
compensation):
The protection of public rights may be accomplished by the
exercise of the police power unless the damage to the property
owner is too great and amounts to a confiscation. The securing
or taking of a benefit not presently enjoyed by the public for its
use is obtained by the government through its power of eminent
domain.164
The court then went on to consider whether preventing alterations to
the natural condition of the state’s lakes and rivers constituted
protection of public rights from harm or the securing of a benefit not
presently enjoyed.165 Central to the court’s reasoning was its recognition
of the interconnectedness of navigable bodies of water and adjacent,
non-navigable wetlands.166 Specifically, the court expressly stated that
its analysis would have been substantially different if the privatelyowned wetlands in question were not adjacent to a navigable lake: “This
is not a case of an isolated swamp unrelated to a navigable lake or
stream, the change of which would cause no harm to public rights.

160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 26 (holding that “the prohibition in the ordinance against the filling of
wetlands is constitutional”).
163. See id. at 14–19.
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id. at 16.
166. Id. at 16–17 (“What makes this case different from most condemnation or police
power zoning cases is the interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural
environment of shorelands to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as
navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty.”).
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Lands adjacent to or near navigable waters exist in a special relationship
to the state.”167 Because changes to adjacent wetlands inevitably impact
navigable lakes and rivers, the court explained, such changes necessarily
implicate the public’s rights in the state’s navigable waters—as well as
the state’s duty to protect and promote those rights—under the public
trust doctrine.168
Consequently, the public trust doctrine assumed a key role in the
court’s reasoning. Specifically, the court stated: “In the instant case we
have a restriction on the use of a citizens’ property, not to secure a
benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm from the change in the
natural character of the citizens’ property.”169
The court then
characterized prevention of such harm as a right presently enjoyed by
the public under the state’s public trust doctrine:
The state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to
eradicate the present pollution and to prevent further pollution
in its navigable waters. This is not, in a legal sense, a gain or a
securing of a benefit by the maintaining of the natural status quo
of the environment.170
Because the rights preserved to the public under the state’s public trust
doctrine include the right to unpolluted navigable waters, a restriction
on the use of private property intended to prevent despoliation of
adjacent navigable waters constitutes an exercise of the state’s police
power intended to prevent harm to rights currently enjoyed, as opposed
to an exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain meant to
secure new benefits for the public.171 On this basis, the court held that
the county’s shoreland zoning ordinance constituted a valid exercise of
the state’s police powers intended to prevent harm to public rights in the
state’s navigable waters:
The shoreland zoning ordinance preserves nature, the
environment, and natural resources as they were created and to
which the people have a present right. The ordinance does not
create or improve the public condition but only preserves nature

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 18.
See id. at 16–17.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
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from the despoilage and harm resulting from the unrestricted
activities of humans.172
IV. A BREACH OF TRUST
The foregoing examination leads to the conclusion that the RockKoshkonong majority incorrectly characterized the court’s prior
decisions as delimiting rather than expanding the scope of the state’s
public trust doctrine. In this respect, the dissent in Rock-Koshkonong
set forth the more accurate portrayal of the court’s public trust
precedents. However, what both the majority and the dissent failed to
recognize is that the underlying premise of the court’s opinion in RockKoshkonong is an artificial distinction between the state’s exercise of its
police powers and its affirmative duties under the public trust doctrine
that is logically untenable within the context of the court’s holding in
Just.
A. A Mischaracterization of the Court’s Precedent
The Rock-Koshkonong majority characterized the court’s public
trust precedents as rigidly restricting the doctrine’s applicability to
navigable bodies of water up to the ordinary high-water marks.173 In
doing so, the majority relied on both Diana Shooting Club and Muench:
the public trust doctrine, the majority explained, is “premised upon the
existence of ‘navigable waters,’” which Muench defined as “navigable in
fact for any purpose”174 and which Diana Shooting Club “confined to a
limited geographic area” between the ordinary high-water marks on the
bank or shore.175 This depiction of the court’s precedents is not
incorrect; Diana Shooting Club and Muench did, in fact, define
“navigable waters” as the Rock-Koshkonong majority described.176
Nonetheless, the majority mischaracterized these cases as delimiting
rather than expanding the scope of the state’s public trust doctrine.177

172. Id. at 23–24 (footnote omitted).
173. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
174. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 76, 350
Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261
Wis. 492, 505–06, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id. ¶ 91.
176. See supra Part III.C.
177. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 93 (describing “the limitation thus stated in the
cases” cited above (emphasis added)).
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This interpretation is inconsistent not only with the language of
Diana Shooting Club and Muench but also with the court’s previous
readings of these cases. In holding that hunting on navigable waters up
to the ordinary high-water marks is a right secured to the public under
the state’s public trust doctrine, the court in Diana Shooting Club
expressly cautioned against a limiting construction of the doctrine: “The
wisdom of the policy which, in the organic laws of our state, steadfastly
and carefully preserved to the people the full and free use of public
waters cannot be questioned. Nor should it be limited or curtailed by
narrow constructions.”178 Similarly, in defining “navigable waters” as
waters navigable in fact for any recreational purpose, the Muench court
was clearly conscious that it was not only altering but furthermore
expanding prior definitions of navigability, which had focused on
navigability for commercial purposes.179 The Muench court highlighted,
for example, “the trend to extend and protect the rights of the public to
the recreational enjoyment of the navigable waters of the state.”180
Later decisions reinforce the assertion that Diana Shooting Club and
Muench sought to expand rather than delimit the scope of Wisconsin’s
public trust doctrine through their definition of “navigable waters.”181
The Rock-Koshkonong majority’s mischaracterization of these decisions
is more pronounced. Specifically, the majority cited De Gayner in
support of the proposition that the “court has rejected theories that
attempt[ed] to extend the public trust doctrine beyond its historical
limitations.”182 The majority went on to state that De Gayner “rejected
a theory offered by an amicus that a stream should be considered ‘as a
navigable water [irrespective of any other finding], because it is a
tributary of a natural and valuable navigable resource, the Namekagon
river.’”183
This description entirely ignores the De Gayner court’s
consideration of the implications of the new test for navigability that
Muench established.184 As the De Gayner court expressly noted, “[I]t
178. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).
179. See supra Part III.C.
180. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 508, 53 N.W.2d 514, 521 (1952)
(emphasis added).
181. See supra Part III.C.
182. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 77 n.29.
183. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting De Gayner & Co. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 70
Wis. 2d 936, 948, 236 N.W.2d 217, 223 (1975)).
184. See supra Part III.C.
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appears, under Muench, that navigability, i.e., the ability to float a skiff
of even the lightest nature, ought not to be the sole test to be applied in
determining whether natural beauty should be supplanted by some manmade project.”185 The De Gayner court went on to describe the broader
test of navigability that Muench foreshadowed as “whether any
beneficial interest whatsoever of the public will be served by the
continued existence of the original stream.”186 Under this test, the De
Gayner court stated, the position urged in the amicus brief would have
“great merit.”187 Although the De Gayner court ultimately declined to
apply this “broader test of navigability,” it did so because the parties to
the case had agreed to the more traditional test of navigability at the
outset of the dispute.188 In this context, the De Gayner court can hardly
be said to have “rejected theories that attempt[ed] to extend the public
trust doctrine beyond its historical limitations,” as the majority in RockKoshkonong contended.189 To the contrary, the De Gayner court clearly
recognized and even highlighted the potential implications of the court’s
decision in Muench to expand the scope of the public trust doctrine
beyond its historical applicability to navigable waters.190
Thus, while the Rock-Koshkonong majority’s treatment of caselaw
defining “navigable waters” is perhaps technically accurate, the court
mischaracterized the general thrust of its precedents in this area.
Consequently, the majority arrived at a conception of Wisconsin’s public
trust doctrine that cannot accommodate any regulation of non-navigable
waters pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction.191
B. A Misunderstanding of Just v. Marinette County
This newly rigid interpretation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine
led the majority to construe Just v. Marinette County as a “textbook
185. De Gayner, 70 Wis. 2d at 949.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 949–50 (“That position is, however, more properly tested in subsequent
proceedings to determine whether a permit to obstruct the stream should be granted. It is not
embraced in the traditional concept of ‘navigability,’ which the parties agreed at the outset
was the only one to be considered in these declaratory proceedings.”).
189. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 77
n.29, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.
190. See supra Part III.C.
191. Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 86 (“There is no constitutional foundation for
public trust jurisdiction over land, including non-navigable wetlands, that is not below the
[ordinary high-water marks] of a navigable lake or stream.” (emphasis omitted)).
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example” of the state’s exercise of its police powers entirely detached
from the state’s public trust jurisdiction.192 The majority reasoned that
the court in Just could not have upheld the shoreland zoning ordinance
at issue in that case under the public trust doctrine because the
shoreland in question did not constitute a navigable body of water as
defined in earlier cases.193 As the dissent noted, the majority’s reasoning
has a circular quality that is clearly problematic.194 Even more
problematic is the fact that “[t]he clear language of Just rebuts the
majority’s conclusion” that the Just court did not rely on the public trust
doctrine.195 The court in Just expressly cited “the active public trust duty
of the state of Wisconsin in respect to navigable waters” that “requires
the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve
those waters for fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty.”196 Nonetheless,
the Rock-Koshkonong majority was, again, not incorrect in noting that
Just upheld the shoreland zoning ordinance at issue in that case as a
valid exercise of the state’s police power; indeed, the Just court explicitly
stated: “Wisconsin has long held that laws and regulations to prevent
pollution and to protect the waters of this state from degradation are
valid police-power enactments.”197
That both the majority and the dissent were able to point to specific
language in Just in support of their conflicting conclusions highlights the
fundamental problem underlying both opinions: failure to recognize that
the public trust doctrine was inseparable from and essential to the
court’s holding in Just that the shoreland zoning ordinance at issue
constituted a valid exercise of the state’s police powers. It is worth
emphasizing here that Just was particularly noteworthy at the time it
was decided in part because courts in other states had, around the same
time, struck down similar ordinances as unconstitutional takings of

192. Id. ¶ 95–96 (“This review of the constitutionally based public trust doctrine does
not disarm the DNR in protecting Wisconsin’s valuable water resources. For instance, the
DNR has broad statutory authority grounded in the state’s police power to protect wetlands
and other water resources.”) (citing Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 10, 201 N.W.2d 761,
765 (1972)).
193. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
194. See Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 171 (Crooks, J., dissenting) (“The majority
imports its conclusion from earlier in the opinion—that the public trust does not extend
beyond the ordinary high water mark—and applies it to support its subsequent conclusion.”).
195. Id. ¶ 170.
196. Just, 56 Wis. 2d. at 18.
197. Id.
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private property.198 By contrast, the Just court upheld the ordinance at
issue against the plaintiffs’ takings claim based on the public trust
doctrine.199 Because Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine recognizes a
public interest in the enjoyment of unpolluted navigable waters and
because navigable waters are inextricably connected to adjacent, nonnavigable wetlands, the court in Just concluded that the shoreland
zoning ordinance at issue did not restrict the use of private property to
secure new benefits for the public but rather to prevent harm to a right
currently enjoyed.200
In this respect, the court in Just can be said to have anticipated the
notion of the public trust doctrine as a governmental defense to a
takings claim,201 a notion that has garnered significant attention since the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.202 In Lucas, the Supreme Court recognized that
regulations duplicating restrictions imposed by “background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance” will not constitute a taking,
even where the regulation results in a complete deprivation of all
beneficial use of the property.203 Foremost among the background
principles that scholars and courts have looked to in the wake of Lucas

198. See Patrick O. Dunphy, The Public Trust Doctrine, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 787, 789 n.12
(1976).
199. See Just, 56 Wis. 2d. at 18; see also Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New
Frontier: Climate Change, Natural Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38
ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 89 (2011) (noting that the court in Just rejected the plaintiff’s takings
claim in holding that regulation at issue “was a valid exercise of the police power based on the
public trust doctrine”).
200. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text; see also Klass, supra note 199, at 89
(highlighting the Just court’s reliance on the public trust doctrine based on “the
interrelationship between preserving the natural status of wetlands and preventing pollution
of navigable waters”); Sarahan, supra note 14, at 568 (describing the Just court as “approving
wetlands regulations premised on the physical interrelationship between the wetlands and the
public trust lands”).
201. See Klass, supra note 103, at 739 (citing Just as an early example of the “idea of the
public trust as a background limitation on private property rights”); Dave Owen, The Mono
Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1099, 1119–20 & n.128 (2012) (identifying the public trust doctrine as a possible defense
against a takings claim where the government engages in environmental protection
regulation, and citing Just as an early example of the use of the doctrine for this purpose);
Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 358–59
(1998) (discussing the public trust doctrine as a governmental defense against takings claims
and noting that a “trace of this idea appeared in Just v. Marinette County”).
202. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
203. Id. at 1029.
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is the public trust doctrine.204 The basic contours of the doctrine as a
defense to a regulatory takings claim have been clearly articulated: to
the extent that the public trust doctrine prohibits harm to resources held
in trust for the public, any regulation that functions to prohibit such
harm cannot constitute a taking.205 Restated in these terms, the court in
Just upheld the shoreland zoning ordinance against the plaintiffs’
takings claim because the regulation was intended to prevent harm to
adjacent navigable waters; insofar as the public trust doctrine prohibited
such harm, the regulation did not constitute a taking.206
While the scope and viability of the public trust doctrine as a
governmental defense to a takings claim remains unsettled,207 the
204. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 342
(2005); Klass, supra note 103, at 740–41; Timothy M. Bagshaw, Note, Unintended
Consequences: Lucas, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Erosion of Private Property Rights
Under the Takings Clause, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1687, 1688–89; Julia K. Bramley, Note,
Supreme Foresight: Judicial Takings, Regulatory Takings, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 38
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 445, 455–56 (2011).
205. Callies & Breemer, supra note 103, at 369 (“If otherwise confiscatory regulations
avoid the compensation requirement as should common law limitations, traditional custom
and public trust are clearly appropriate candidates for identification as categorical takings
exceptions.”); John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles
Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 955 (2012) (“Because no water
right holder can claim an entitlement to exercise its water right in a fashion that harms public
trust resources, a regulation designed to prevent such harm does not impair a protected
property right and, therefore, cannot provide the basis for a successful takings claim.”).
206. Some commentators have explicitly framed the Just decision in these terms, see
Sarahan, supra note 14, at 568–69, while others have asserted more generally that the Lucas
background principles defense applies where the government seeks to protect public trust
resources by regulating adjacent, privately-owned property, see Archer & Stone, supra note
14, at 113.
207. Although the Supreme Court in Lucas provided minimal guidance regarding what
constitutes a “background principle,” the general consensus among scholars appears to be
that the public trust doctrine should provide a defense to a takings claim under Lucas. See
Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 204, at 343–44 (“Therefore, in states that have adopted an
expansive view of public rights, the public trust doctrine can be effectively used as a defense
to takings claims in a variety of situations.”); Callies & Breemer, supra note 103, at 372–73
(“It is fair to say that states can, therefore, prohibit land uses inconsistent with the traditional
public trust without paying just compensation.”); Echeverria, supra note 205, at 955
(“[C]ourts should readily acknowledge that the public trust doctrine provides a background
principles defense to a takings claim based on regulatory restrictions on the use of water
designed to protect fish or other trust resources from harm.”). Nonetheless, commentators
recognize that the scope of the public trust doctrine varies widely from state to state, and
there remains significant disagreement regarding the extent to which the doctrine should
provide a defense to a takings claim. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 204, at 343
(acknowledging gradual expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond its traditional scope
but asserting that Lucas permits evolution of background principles); Callies & Bremmer at
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general framework illustrates the fundamental illogic of distinguishing
between regulation pursuant to the public trust doctrine and regulation
pursuant to the state’s police powers within the context of the Just
decision. Toward the end of its discussion of Just, the RockKoshkonong majority attempted to establish a clear distinction between
the state’s public trust jurisdiction and its police powers, describing the
latter as “subject to constitutional and statutory protections afforded to
property.”208 What both the majority and the dissent failed to recognize
is that this distinction is untenable when applied to the type of shoreland
regulation at issue in Rock-Koshkonong and upheld by the court in Just.
Put differently, the Just court upheld the state’s exercise of its police
powers against the “constitutional and statutory protections afforded to
property” because Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine not only allowed
but compelled the state to protect and promote the public’s interest in
adjacent navigable waters.209
A proper understanding of the relationship between the state’s
public trust jurisdiction and its police powers renders unfounded the
majority’s concern that reliance on the public trust doctrine to regulate
non-navigable wetlands would call into question the private ownership
of such wetlands. As the dissent pointed out, and as Just itself made
clear, regulation of non-navigable bodies of water pursuant to the public
trust doctrine does not assert state ownership.210 Rather, such regulation
merely recognizes the interconnectedness of the state’s water resources
and, consequently, the state’s occasional need to restrict some uses of
private property in order to fulfill its affirmative obligations as trustee of
the state’s navigable waters under the public trust doctrine.211
357, 372–73 (citing state court expansion of the geographic and substantive scope of the
public trust doctrine over the last three decades and arguing that the doctrine as a defense to
a takings claim should be limited to its more traditional, historical scope); Echeverria, supra
note 205, at 951, 954–55 (noting that “the actual contours of the [public trust] doctrine remain
somewhat uncertain” but concluding that these distinctions are largely irrelevant in the
context of a takings claim).
208. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 101,
350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.
209. See supra Part III.D.
210. See Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 173 (Crooks, J., dissenting); Just v.
Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 16, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972) (noting that the dispute in this
case “causes us to reexamine the concepts of public benefit in contrast to public harm and the
scope of an owner’s right to use of his property” (emphasis added)).
211. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 18 (“This is not a case of an isolated swamp unrelated to a
navigable lake or stream . . . which would cause no harm to public rights. Lands adjacent to
or near navigable waters exist in a special relationship to the state.”).
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V. THE FUTURE OF WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
In the wake of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in RockKoshkonong, reactions have been mixed. While business lobbying
groups have praised the decision as clarifying “a lot of ambiguity that
has resulted over the years in case law,” environmental advocates have
raised concerns that the decision “backtrack[s] on [Wisconsin’s] . . .
strong history” of protecting its waters as a public resource.212 Reactions
within the legal community have been similarly equivocal. While there
appears to be a general consensus that the majority’s interpretation of
Just represents a notable departure from previous interpretations,213
commentators have disagreed on what the long-term implications of the
Rock-Koshkonong decision will be. Specifically, while some have
described the decision as “a significant reversal in thinking by one of the
most traditionally protective states in terms of an environmental public
trust doctrine,”214 others have noted that the court’s commentary on the
public trust doctrine in Rock-Koshkonong is largely dicta that future
courts are not required to follow.215
The extent to which the Rock-Koshkonong decision might lead to
Wisconsin courts refusing to uphold regulation of non-navigable waters
pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction cannot be known, and the
point that Rock-Koshkonong did not actually overturn any of the court’s
public trust precedents is an important one. Nonetheless, to discount
the Rock-Koshkonong majority’s characterization of these precedents as

212. See Marley, supra note 7 (quoting Scott Manley, vice president of government
relations for Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, and Elizabeth Wheeler, an attorney
with Clean Wisconsin).
213. See Scanlan, supra note 8 (discussing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in
Just and the Rock-Koshkonong majority’s extensive commentary reinterpreting this
decision); Robin Kundis Craig, Wisconsin Backs off Its Public Trust Doctrine, ENVTL. L.
PROF BLOG (Aug. 12, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2013/08/wi
sconsin-backs-off-its-public-trust-doctrine.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5MDK-5ZQ8
(indicating that “the Rock-Koshkonong majority reinterpreted a classic public trust doctrine
case, Just v. Marinette County, to be a police power case” (citations omitted)). But see Mary
Beth Peranteau & William P. O’Connor, Public Trust and Agency Discretion Principles Intact,
WIS. LAW., Mar. 2014, at 34, 35 (asserting that the Rock-Koshkonong decision is “consistent
with a long line of cases that limit the scope of delegated authority under separation-ofpowers principles”).
214. Craig, supra note 213.
215. Scanlan, supra note 8 (“[T]he muddying of the water on public trust jurisprudence
should not be overblown. As this reasoning was unnecessary to the outcome of the decision,
it can be properly characterized as dicta that future courts aren’t bound to follow.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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confusing but harmless dicta is to ignore what has been the true
hallmark of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine: the doctrine’s particular
“elasticity,”216 which has allowed Wisconsin courts to “continually
expand[] what they recognize as the public’s interest in public trust
resources to include everything from the right to hunt to the right to
maintain pollution-free water.”217 As early as 1927, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court itself recognized this “elastic” quality of the state’s
public trust doctrine, stating, “The term ‘navigation’ itself in its
definition is quite as indefinite and shifting as the so-called trust title.”218
Later courts have seized upon this notion and consistently demonstrated
a willingness to redefine key concepts such as navigability and public
rights in the state’s navigable waters as societal needs and values have
changed.219
As recently as 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court availed itself of
the particular adaptability of the state’s public trust doctrine in
upholding the WDNR’s authority to regulate drilling of a high capacity
well pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction.220 In Lake Beulah
Management District v. State Department of Natural Resources, the court
addressed the question of whether the WDNR, in issuing drilling
permits, could consider the environmental impact that a municipal well
with a capacity of 1.4 million gallons per day would have on Lake
Beulah, a navigable body of water located 1,200 feet from the site of the
proposed well.221 In holding that the WDNR possessed authority to
consider the environmental impact of the proposed well, the court in
Lake Beulah identified the state’s public trust doctrine as the source of
that authority.222 More specifically, the court relied implicitly on the
notion—first recognized in Just223—that the state’s water resources are
interconnected, and that the state’s affirmative duty to protect its
navigable waters under the public trust doctrine necessarily requires
some regulation of non-navigable waters such as the underground water

216. Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View into
the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129 (2012).
217. See Scanlan, supra note 10, at 137.
218. City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 446–47, 214 N.W. 820, 829 (1927).
219. See supra Parts III.C–D.
220. See Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2011 WI 54, ¶ 3, 335
Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73.
221. Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 12, 30.
222. Id. ¶ 62.
223. See supra Part III.D.
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at issue in this case.224 In the wake of the Rock-Koshkonong decision,
the court’s continued willingness to extend the public trust doctrine in a
similar fashion is at best questionable and at worst foreclosed by the
decision’s ossification of the doctrine’s scope.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the context of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s public trust
precedents, the most notable feature of the Rock-Koshkonong decision
is its re-casting of the state’s public trust doctrine as static and settled,
with clearly delineated boundaries. As certain proponents of the
decision have noted, perhaps with unintentional insight, “[T]he decision
creates a bright line that makes clear the public trust doctrine applies
only to navigable waterways.”225 While those who contend that RockKoshkonong does not overturn any of the court’s public trust precedents
are correct, they fail to consider fully the implications of the case going
forward. By subtly re-characterizing the court’s precedents as delimiting
rather than expanding the state’s public trust jurisdiction, the RockKoshkonong decision undermines the particular adaptability of
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, which has allowed the doctrine to
evolve along with societal values and public needs and which, for
decades, has situated Wisconsin as a leader in using the public trust
doctrine for environmental protection. After Rock-Koshkonong, the
state’s future as a leader in this area appears as unsettled as the ongoing
dispute over those seven inches of water on Lake Koshkonong.
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224. See Lake Beulah, 2011 WI 54, ¶ 34 (noting that “the legislature has delegated the
State’s public trust duties to the DNR in the context of its regulation of high capacity wells
and their potential effect on navigable waters such as Lake Beulah” (emphasis added)). For
additional discussion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s prior willingness to continually
expand the scope of the state’s public trust jurisdiction in light of the interconnectedness of
the state’s water resources, see Scanlan, supra note 216, at 138–40 (noting that “[t]he extent
to which Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine influences state management of additional,
nonnavigable, artificial, or underground water is based on the interactions between these
waters and navigable waters”).
225. See Marley, supra note 7 (citing Scott Manley, vice president of government
relations for Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce).
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